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NASA’S CAPABILITY EVOLUTION TOWARD COMMERCIAL SPACE 
 
ABSTRACT 
We discuss how the space industry moved from a government dominated field to a 
commercially driven field. In the context of this industry shift, we explore how NASA’s 
capabilities developed from its early hierarchical model, to the inter-governmental and then 
commercial network models. We refer in particular to NASA’s organizational, cultural, 
relational and technological capabilities. These developments over time suggest that these 
are dynamic capabilities that respond to the demands of the external environment and to 
mission imperatives.  
 
From Government Dominance to Commercial Space 
What was once the province of the US and Russian governments has now become a 
global, multi-faceted, multi-stakeholder endeavor. Out of a value of US$ 383.5 bn of space 
activity in 2017, 80% (US$ 307.3 bn) was accounted for by commercial products, services, 
infrastructure and support industries. The US government accounted for 11.3% (US$ 43.3 
bn) and other world governments combined for 8.5% (US$ 32.8 bn) of that amount1.  
Commercial space has been growing at an accelerating pace as the economics of the 
industry are changing to make offerings more affordable and accessible for industry, 
government and individuals. The development of re-usable launch vehicles (such as those 
developed by Space-X and Blue Origin), nano-satellites (weighing 10kg or less), and more 
efficient propulsion systems are all part of this trend.  
The development of small satellites is creating more cost effective options for 
companies offering broadband, remote imaging and communication services2. According to 
the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, there are 7,677 objects that have been 
launched into space since 19573. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) notes that the 
total number of satellites that are currently operating is 1,459. Of these, 593 are US 
satellites, 135 are Russian, 192 are Chinese, and the remaining belong to other nations. Of 
the 593 US satellites, 297 are commercial, 150 are military, 136 are government and 10 are 
civil4.  
The availability of expanded sources of financing is enabling new entrants to 
compete in the space sector5. There were 80 new space ventures created in the US during 
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the period 2000 to 2015. These received a total of $13.3 bn in funding during this period. Of 
this, $5.1 bn was debt financing, $2.9 bn was venture capital, $2.2 bn was the value of 
acquisitions, and $1.8 bn was private equity. The amount of funding ballooned from $1.1 bn 
during 2000-2005 to $6.1 bn during 2006-2010 and to $13.3bn during 2011-20156.  
Continued development of the US commercial space sector will be affected by issues 
such as regulation and growth constraints placed by export controls7. In addition to NASA, 
there are several other agencies with commercial space interests and responsibilities, 
including FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Department of Commerce, 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Federal Communications 
Commission. Despite relevant legislation calling for some relief from regulation of the space 
sector compared to other industries, the multitude of agencies involved creates red tape 
new entrants and established companies. Further, export controls currently limit the export 
of selected space technology since some items are regarded as dual-use in that they have 
possible military applications.  
Even though much of current space-related spending is ultimately driven by 
government demand, ultimately commercial market offerings will predominate, especially if 
government policies support their development8.  
 
Why Commercial Space? 
The commercialization of space has been a long standing policy of the federal 
government, that has instituted corresponding legislation. The Commercial Space Launch 
Act (1984) for example noted that: “private applications of space technology have achieved 
a significant level of commercial and economic activity, and offer the potential for growth in 
the future, particularly in the United States. ... the development of commercial launch 
vehicles and associated services would enable the United States to retain its competitive 
position internationally, thereby contributing to the national interest and economic well-
being of the United States.  ... the United States should encourage private sector launches 
and associated services.” This and subsequent acts have also exempted the commercial 
space sector from certain types of federal regulation, to ease its expansion. Part of the 
state’s concern has been not only to spur innovation in the space sector but also to 
accomplish things more efficiently given critiques of NASA’s levels of efficiency as well as 
the state’s own budget constraints9.  
  
 4 
Commercial space companies such as Space X and Blue Origin, even though they 
often license NASA technology, compete for NASA contracts and employ NASA scientists, 
can undertake certain tasks (such as transporting cargo to the International Space Station) 
more efficiently than NASA. For example, NASA used its cost estimation methodology 
(NASA-Air Force Cost Model or NAFCOM) to estimate the development costs if NASA was to 
develop the Falcon 9 rocket of Space X itself, using its traditional development model10. It 
was estimated that the costs would reach US$ 4 bn. Under more commercial assumptions in 
the model, where there is less involvement by the government and higher flexibility for the 
commercial partner, the estimated costs were US$ 1.7 bn.  Space X announced that the 
development costs of the Falcon 9 (plus an earlier version, Falcon 1), were US$ 390 m, one 
quarter of the NASA’s lowest estimate.  
On a grander and more meaningful scale, commercial space will be instrumental in 
helping humanity reach the longer term goal of becoming an inter-planetary species as 
advocated by entrepreneurs and luminaries such as Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Stephen 
Hawking. NASA’s Global Exploration Roadmap indeed assumes the fundamental 
contribution of commercial space, along with government investments, as a cornerstone of 
humanity having the ability to reach beyond Low Earth Orbit to Mars and deep space11.  
 
NASA’s Capability Evolution Towards Commercial Space 
Since its early days, NASA has contracted with the commercial sector for the supply 
of specialized equipment and services. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory operated by the 
California Institute of Technology was a contractor facility before becoming part of NASA. 
NACA (the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics), NASA’s predecessor, allocated the 
contracts to private companies for the airframe (in 1955) and engines (in 1966) for the X-15, 
a hypersonic rocket-propelled aircraft. When NASA was formed in 1958 it continued the 
practice of working with the commercial sector. Then in 2006, NASA started the process for 
contracting out the construction and operation of Commercial Resupply Services vehicles, 
that would carry out unmanned resupply missions to the International Space Station. In 
2010 NASA initiated the Commercial Crew Program, to contract out the creation and 
operation of spacecraft that could conduct manned missions to the International Space 
Station; to carry at least four astronauts, dock for 180 days and return them to earth. These 
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two programs provided seed funding, opportunity and impetus for more commercial 
companies to enter the space industry.  
The space industry has been going through a structural shift from state dominance in 
earlier days towards commercial enterprise, lower barriers to entry, higher collaboration 
between state and commercial actors, and innovation in terms of its offerings. The 
traditional industry model was a hierarchical one, where commercial entities have been 
suppliers to state agencies that conceived of, led and carried out missions. The industry has 
been morphing to a network model where collaboration across commercial as well as state 
entities is crucial and where commercial entities can launch their own missions both as 
partners and as competitors. Government space agencies are contracting out more aspects 
of low earth orbit missions, and are focusing their resources on the bigger prize of deep 
space exploration such as NASA’s planned mission to Mars12.  
Often the traditional hierarchical and new network models of NASA’s relationship 
with commercial space are contrasted, as in Table 1 below. In the traditional model NASA 
was the prime contractor and exclusive customer, buying the technologies it needed with 
the relationship based on cost-plus contracts. NASA gave detailed specifications of what 
should be done and how, and incurred the total cost. The owner of the resulting technology 
was NASA. There was penetration of NASA engineers in contractor operations, with large 
amounts of control over what the contractors were doing, to ensure the meeting of 
specifications.  
In the new, commercial-oriented approach, NASA enters a public-private partnership 
with fixed-price contracts, where it does not own the resulting technology. Commercial 
entities can sell their services to other customers. Costs are shared, with NASA paying for 
milestones reached. Rather than providing detailed specifications for the what and the how, 
NASA specifies high level goals, leaving the how to the commercial partners. 
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Table 1: The early space and commercial-oriented development approaches 
Source: Adapted from NASA, 2012: 413 
 
While this binary comparison is useful, it also somewhat oversimplifies things. We 
advance discussion in this domain in two ways. First, we suggest that we can understand 
NASA’s new approach in terms of an evolution over time, that includes a transitional phase 
in which NASA honed its capabilities and learning to be able to advance to the commercial 
network model. Second, we argue that NASA has been able to advance to this model by 
developing its organizational, cultural, relational and technological capabilities over time, so 
as to be able to work more effectively with commercial entities.  
We outline the traditional approach, the transitional phase and the commercial 
network phase, each of which can be exemplified by an archetypal project: Apollo, 
International Space Station, and the Commercial Resupply Program respectively.  
The Apollo program was initiated as a response to perceived Russian superiority in 
space and challenge of the US for long-term space leadership14. Substantial budgetary and 
organizational resources were allocated to the program by the government with the 
focused objective of accomplishing the challenge that President Kennedy posed in 1961: of 
getting a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth before the decade was out. In 
the Apollo program, NASA’s organizational capabilities included technological knowledge 
that allowed it to develop detailed engineering specifications; large systems integration 
Program characteristic Early	space age	approach Commercial-oriented	approach
Owner NASA Industry
Contract	fee-type Cost	plus Fixed	price
Contract	management Prime contractor Public-private	partnership
Customer(s) NASA Government	and	non-
government
Funding for	capability	
demonstration
NASA	procures	capability NASA	provides	investment via	
milestone	payments
NASA’s	role	in	capability
development
NASA	defines “what”	and	
“how”
NASA	only	defines “what”,	
industry	defines	“how”
Requirements definition NASA	defines	detailed
requirements
NASA	defines	top-level	
capabilities needed
Cost	structure NASA	incurs total	cost NASA	and industry	cost	share
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imported from the military, and the ability to work with and supervise contractors15. There 
was a cultural belief in technological superiority and exceptionalism16. NASA’s relationships 
with contractors were hierarchical, with NASA delivering specifications as Moses delivered 
the ten commandments. Technological capability development was agency-driven, with a 
unitary engineering architecture.  
The International Space Station fostered and exhibited organizational capabilities of 
international collaboration and inter-governmental partnerships17. Culturally, the sense of 
technological superiority was still there, but now accompanied with greater cost 
consciousness. Relationally, the sense of hierarchical pecking order was supplemented by a 
cluster of international governmental organizations, with NASA as the orchestrator and 
influencer. Technologically, NASA leveraged international public investments, distributed 
technical responsibility and worked on developing shared technical interfaces, standards 
and protocols18. During this phase, NASA honed its learning of how to function in a cluster of 
partners rather than how to be the dominant party in a buyer/supplier relationship.  
The Commercial Resupply Program was initiated to carry cargo to the International 
Space Station after the space shuttle was retired19 and formed a substantial impetus for 
further development of the commercial space sector, including Space X that won the 
contract to resupply the ISS20. In the Commercial Resupply Program, NASA’s organizational 
capabilities were focused on specifying end goals and ongoing partnering (public-private 
partnerships). Culturally there was higher commercial awareness and cost consciousness, as 
well as openness to solutions created anywhere within the network. Relationally NASA was 
part of a network of clusters rather than a single cluster, and acted as a catalyst for industry 
technology development. Technologically NASA leverages industry investments and initiates 
open innovation programs.  
Table 2 below outlines the traditional, transitional and commercial network models:  
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Table 2: Evolution of NASA capabilities over time 
Source: Authors 
 
Development of Dynamic Capabilities at NASA 
 In order to understand NASA’s evolution in its relationship with commercial entities, 
from its traditional contracting model to its current network model, we need to view it as a 
learning process where organizational, cultural, relational and technological capabilities 
were gradually honed towards that objective. Reaching this point is an important step in the 
process of focusing resources on reaching Mars and deep space. NASA’s Global Exploration 
Roadmap21 (particularly the end goal of reaching manned missions to Mars via progressively 
building on missions of increasing complexity) is predicated on dynamic capabilities, that 
evolve over time as a result of learning from experience.  
It is clear NASA’s capabilities have developed over time, and that the growth of the 
commercial-oriented approach has created impetus for further cultural and organizational 
change within NASA22. NASA for example now engages in open innovation23, posing 
innovation challenges online in open competitions, as a complement to internal innovation 
Development
approach
Traditional	model Transitional	model Commercial	networkmodel
Project examples	 Apollo International	Space	Station	
(1993-present)
Commercial	Resupply	
Program(2006-present)
Selected	sources Beggs (1984)
Siddiqi	 (2000)
DeLucas	(1996)
Kitmacher et	al	(2005)
Lambright	(2015)
Lindenmoyer &	Stone	
(2010)
Organizational	
capabilities
Engineering	specifications,
Contractor	supervision,	
Large	systems	integration
International	collaboration,	
Inter-governmental	
partnerships (public-public	
partnerships)
Specification of	end	goals,	
Ongoing	partnering	(public-
private	partnerships)
Cultural	attributes	
& capabilities
Technical	superiority,	
Exceptionalism
Technical	superiority,	
Increased	cost	consciousness
Commercial awareness,	
Cost consciousness,	
Openness	 to	industry-
sourced	solutions
Relational	
capabilities
Hierarchy,	Positional	
authority,	NASA	as	Moses
Cluster,	NASA	as	
orchestrator,	Exercise	of	
influence
Network	of	clusters, NASA	
as	catalyst	for	industry
technology	development
Technological
capabilities
Agency driven	
investments,	Unitary	
engineering	architecture
Agency	leverages	
international public	
investments,	Distributed	
responsibility,	 Interfaces,	
common	standards	&	
protocols
Agency	leverages	industry	
investments,	 Initiates	open	
innovation	 programs
  
 9 
efforts. Given the substantial shifts in NASA’s external and internal environment, it was 
suggested that the agency should take two steps. One, it should be given more flexibility to 
manage its infrastructure and human resources based on market-based, competitive 
principles. Second, that it should become a real network organization, effectively integrated 
both internally across its own field centres, and externally with commercial organizations, 
research centers, universities or think-tanks that produce space-related knowledge24. Such 
developments would be consistent with the commercial network model and would hone its 
commercial capabilities further. These developments are also crucial If humanity is to 
ultimately become an inter-planetary species as insurance for its survival, because they 
enable relevant space-related knowledge from wherever it is present to serve this goal.  
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